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U.S. Antitrust and Doing Business Abroad: Recent
Trends and Developments
by Joel Davidow*
The recent successful completion and endorsement of the Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations is a direct reflection of America's long-standing
commitment to removing governmental restraints on trade, thus enhanc-
ing the freedom and fairness of the world trading system. Equally im-
portant to that commitment is our continuing enforcement of U.S.
antitrust laws against private restraints on international trade.
Sherman Act sections 1 and 2,' enacted in 1890, prohibit both con-
spiracies to restrain, and attempts to monopolize, the domestic or foreign
commerce of the United States. The Clayton Act of 19142 prohibits an-
ticompetitive mergers by all firms engaged in domestic or foreign com-
merce. Generally speaking, these laws apply to domestic and foreign
firms without discrimination, and to transactions in the United States
and abroad. What then is unique about the application of antitrust rules
to international business? The answer is that antitrust issues in foreign
commerce often involve special problems concerning jurisdiction, and
special exceptions and defenses. This paper will discuss these special is-
sues, and then will review recent enforcement developments.
I. Jurisdictional Issues
It is helpful in analyzing the many jurisdictional issues in an inter-
national antitrust case to divide the general concept into four more pre-
cise categories: legislative jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction
over information, and jurisdiction in regard to elements relevant to relief.
A. Legis/ative Jursdic/ion
The first question in examining whether an act in U.S. foreign com-
merce can provide the basis for a suit under the Sherman Act is to deter-
mine whether it is the kind of act the legislature intended the law to
encompass. This determination may turn on an analysis of what kind of
acts or actors were intended to be covered, as in concluding that the
Director, Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice. B.A. 1960,
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1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
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Sherman Act is not aimed at restrictive "acts of state" but only at busi-
ness conduct. The issue usually arises when the key acts take place
abroad and application of U.S. antitrust laws would have to be based on
their effects on U.S. commerce. In modern times our courts have regu-
larly ruled that Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply even to acts
done wholly abroad, by Americans or foreigners, if those acts have "in-
tended and actual" or "substantial and foreseeable" effects on U.S. com-
merce.3 These limitations on Sherman Act jurisdiction are inferred by
the courts not only from an analysis of congressional intent but also by
assuming that international law exists, that it creates limits on the legisla-
tive jurisdiction of states, and that it permits jurisdiction based on the
direct and foreseeable effects of conduct abroad but not based on "indi-
rect" or "unforeseeable" effects stemming from such conduct. 4 Unfortu-
nately for smooth diplomatic relations, not all nations have the same
view of what international law tells us about antitrust jurisdiction.5 U.S.
courts have recently sought to refine this area of law by using the concept
of "comity" among nations and a balancing test similar to that employed
in conflict of law cases.
To illustrate, assume two rival American firms each discover a sup-
ply of a rare metal in Antarctica needed primarily in the United States,
and then conspire to sell it to U.S. buyers at secretly fixed prices. Appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to this scheme would probably be held not to
involve any jurisdictional, international law, comity or balancing consid-
erations, simply because there are no conflicting factors to balance. But
assume a challenge to a rationalization cartel among two German firms
in Germany, where the cartel was legal, and where the challenge in-
volved a range of products sold worldwide, only two percent of which
reach the United States. In those circumstances, assertion ofjurisdiction
under the Sherman Act to punish or prevent the arrangement would
undoubtedly raise jurisdictional, international law and political issues.
Application of the new comity-balancing test, as enunciated by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,6 and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Manninglon Mills v.
Congoleum Corp. ,7 would probably lead to dismissal on the grounds that
the United States' minor contacts with and interest in the transaction is
3 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05
(1962); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-89 (1952); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,443-44 (2d Cir. 1945); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 18 (1965).
4 148 F.2d 416; Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 608-15 (9th
Cir. 1976). Some have criticized the distinction between "substantial and foreseeable" and "in-
direct and unforeseeable" effects as inadequate. See, e.g., Fortenberry, Jursdiction Over Extrater-
n'toral Antitrust o/atns-Paths Through the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 534-36
(1971).
5 See, e.g., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., [1978] 1 All E.R. 434,
[1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (House of Lords).
6 549 F.2d 597.
7 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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outweighed by Germany's contacts and interests. In a related develop-
ment, the Justice Department has announced that it will take comity
into account in deciding whether to prosecute a foreign-based transac-
tion where another nation's interests predominate.8
A final issue concerning the scope of Sherman Act substantive juris-
diction is whether a restraint of U.S. commerce is exempted because it
causes no adverse effects to the United States, as when only foreigners
abroad are injured by it. The Justice Department's answer, contained in
the introduction to its 1977 Antitrust Guidefor International Operattons,9 is
that it normally will prosecute only those restraints which would be
likely to injure consumers in the United States or lessen trading opportu-
nities for those exporting from the United States. The answer of the
courts has been somewhat more equivocal. Moreover, the Justice De-
partment warned that conspiracies injuring foreigners might well run
afoul of newly strengthened antitrust laws abroad or occasion an interna-
tional inquiry pursuant to antitrust codes of conduct adopted by the
OECD and being negotiated at the United Nations.10
Congress' intent not to incriminate joint selling to foreigners that
causes no injury at home is codified in the Webb-Pomerene Act of
1918, I t which expressly exempts commodity export associations regis-
tered with the Federal Trade Commission from the Sherman Act. The
exemption is rarely sought. Fewer than thirty associaticns are active, ac-
counting for less than two percent of U.S. exports. Three associations,
dealing in motion pictures, sulphur, and phosphate, account for the bulk
of the transactions. It appears that most U.S. exporters prefer to sell
abroad on an independent basis, or are convinced by the Antitrust Divi-
sion's assurances that joint conduct meeting the standard of the Webb-
Pomerene exemption would not be treated as illegal even in the absence
of such a statute, and even if the association deals in services rather than
products. The National Commission to Review Antitrust Laws and Pro-
cedures reported in early 1979 that the export exemption creates oppor-
tunities for domestic spillover, hinders diplomatic negotiation of pro-
competitive rules, and is unnecessary, since its procompetitive purposes
could be accomplished without an antitrust exemption.12 The members
of the Commission divided on whether Webb-Pomerene should be re-
8 Address by Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General, before the International Bar
Association, Business Law Section, Nov. 3, 1977; Address by Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of
the United States, before the American Bar Association, Aug. 8, 1977.
9 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE]. Set Remarks of Douglas
E Rosenthal, of the Antirust Division, On Guidefor International Operations, [1977] 805 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) G-1.
10 Id
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976).
12 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES 295-306 (statement of ma-
jority) (Jan. 22, 1979); 393-96 (separate view of Commissioner Javits).
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pealed outright or should be amended to make the exemption dependent
on a showing of need.
The substantive reach of the Clayton Act merger control provision is
somewhat more limited than that of the Sherman Act. The merger, ac-
quisition, or joint venture is covered only if it would be likely to lessen
competition substantially in any part of the United States. The provi-
sion is fully applicable to a merger or joint venture with a foreign firm, or
even among foreign firms, but only if there will be an adverse effect in
the United States. If, for instance, an American firm seeks to merge with
a British company that has a subsidiary in the United States already
competing with the U.S. firm, the merger may be illegal because of the
horizontal overlap in America, the British parentage of the competing
firm being largely irrelevant in analyzing the substantive legality of the
transaction. 13 If a leading American firm seeks to merge with a foreign
firm which exports competing products into the U.S. market, or any part
of it, the merger would probably be illegal unless the parties could
demonstrate that changed international conditions, such as exchange
rate shifts or tariff increases, were going to make future export competi-
tion impracticable. 14 If the foreign merger partner has not competed in
the U.S. market, but sells the same type of products and would have
entered the market separately but for the merger, the transaction might
be challenged as eliminating potential competition, which might be sig-
nificant if the market were dominated by a few firms and there were not
many outside firms capable of entering it. Nevertheless, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has held that such a merger will be illegal only if it
can be proved that competitive entry by the foreign firm would have
occurred within a foreseeable time period. 15
In sum, a rather low percentage of all mergers are challenged under
the antitrust laws. Mergers involving foreign firms are challenged no
more frequently than those only involving domestic firms. It is irrelevant
to these cases whether the foreign firm seeks to buy a U.S. firm, or vice
versa. Cases in which the firms are only potential competitors of each
other have become less frequent, and challenges based solely on that is-
sue have seldom been upheld in recent years.
The Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 19 7 6 16 requires
that prior to any merger or acquisition of substantial size (roughly speak-
ing, a $10 million acquisition by a $100 million firm) detailed informa-
tion regarding the products and markets of both firms must be submitted
13 See United States v. Merck & Co., [1979] 928 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
A-33; United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966) a fdper
curim, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
14 United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975); see also the consent
decree in the same action, [1976-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 60,691 (D. Mass. 1975).
15 BOC International, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(c-h), 18(a), 66 (1976).
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to the FTC and the Antitrust Division. 17 International mergers are sub-
ject to these requirements, but care has been taken to avoid asking for
burdensome information unrelated to operations in or directed toward
the United States. 8
B. PersonalJurisdiction
It is usually not possible to obtain adjudication of an antitrust claim
unless personal jurisdiction over the defendant can be obtained. In re-
gard to a foreign defendant, the relevant test, stemming from the
Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe Co. v. Wash'ngton' 9 is
whether there were sufficient minimum contacts with the forum so that
the application of its law will work no injustice. Related questions of
venue may also arise. There is often a further question of whether the
foreign parent of a defendant may also be deemed to be within the
court's jurisdiction. That issue turns on whether the parent firm exer-
cised sufficient control over the functioning of the subsidiary in the trans-
actions that provide the basis of the antitrust charge to warrant its
inclusion. 20
The Department of Justice has stated its willingness, where appro-
priate, to seek indictment even of an absent defendant against whom
personal jurisdiction is not available. This is done to force the culprit to
answer the antitrust charge or refrain from entering the United States for
business or other purposes while the indictment pends-possibly indefi-
nitely.2 1
C Jurzsdiction over Information
The principal activity of the Antitrust Division is not prosecution
but investigation. When the subject of the investigation is a transaction
in foreign commerce, it often happens that crucial information is located
abroad. If such information is owned or controlled by a firm in the
United States, compulsory process can often be obtained to demand its
production here.2 2 There are, however, a significant number of occasions
in which the country where the information is located may object to its
production abroad. The potential objection is that the information is
confidential or involves matters of state, or that the country objects to the
application of U.S. antitrust laws to matters involving them.23 It is now
17 Id § 18(a).
18 16 C.F.R. §§ 802.50-.52 (1979).
19 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20 See Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930 (D. Utah
1962), ajf'dper curim, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
21 United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, [1974]
690 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-6; ANTITRUST GUIDE supra note 9, at 56-7.
22 United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
23 See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); In re Westinghouse Elec.
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fairly well settled that a rigid foreign prohibition against removing infor-
mation ordinarily provides a defense against a charge of contempt of a
subpoena in an American investigation or prosecution, although the firm
may be required to seek a waiver of such prohibition. 24 Greater efforts
are being made to solve these issues diplomatically by informing foreign
governments as early as possible, employing voluntary requests when
possible, and clarifying safeguards for ensuring the confidentiality of sen-
sitive material which is produced. An interesting variation on this rule
concerns the effect of foreign law on witnesses in the United States. In a
recent case involving a Bahamas banker subpoenaed by a grand jury in
Florida, the court of appeals held Bahamanian law could not operate
extraterritorially to justify his refusal to answer the grand jury's ques-
tions.25
D. Juri'dicion in Regard to Reief
Although there is jurisdiction as to the offense, the parties and the
evidence, a full remedy may not be possible in some international anti-
trust cases because U.S. courts lack jurisdiction or effective power to alter
legal relationships abroad. The courts have had difficulty in compelling
the licensing of patents held abroad, dissolving a trade association in an-
other country, or undoing a merger consummated in another country. 26
Conceivably, the court's power over the parties would enable it to use the
contempt sanction to compel compliance in such situations, but foreign
third parties who benefit from the status quo may be able to obtain a
foreign court order or government directive. This would prevent compli-
ance with the U.S. order and establish an impossibility defense to a
charge of contempt of the U.S. relief order.
I1. Defenses
Most of the defenses available in international antitrust cases relate
to the involvement of foreign governments in the restraint of trade being
challenged. Many of the defenses are analogous to ones that can be
raised when the U.S. Government, or the government of a state of the
United States, is involved in a domestic restraint. The rationale for re-
jecting such defenses in certain circumstances is also similar.
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Uranium, [1980-81]
Trade Cases 63,124 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
24 563 F.2d 992; Federal Maritime Comm'n v. De Smedt, 268 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
25 United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 535 F.2d 660 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
26 See British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R.
780 (C.A. 1952); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963]
Trade Cases (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), decree modified, [1965] Trade Cases (CCH)
71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. CIBA Corp., [1970] Trade Cases (CCH) 73,269
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (consent decree).
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In the Noerr2 7 and Pennington28 cases the Supreme Court found no
violation of the Sherman Act when competitors jointly petition a state or
federal legislator or administrative official for a law or regulation that
will help those companies or hurt their rivals. U.S. cases are in disagree-
ment concerning whether American companies have a protected right to
seek monopoly rights from foreign officials. 29 The Antitrust Division has
assured in its Guide that it will recognize such a right.30
A defense is normally available if trade is restrained by the sovereign
act of a foreign state. Typical examples of this include cases where one
U.S. firm sued another for inducing a foreign government to expropriate
the first one's assets or seize its mining claim.3 1 Generally, U.S. courts
will not examine the motives for such sovereign acts, or award antitrust
damages to those injured by them.
There is also a defense available if suspect conduct was compelled
by foreign laws, regulations or directives.3 2 There remains some uncer-
tainty concerning the extent to which foreign government approval of a
restrictive practice will provide a defense in a U.S. case. In the Swiss
Watchmakers33 case, the court held that tacit Swiss Government approval
of the cartel would not excuse it. Analogously, in the more recent Detroit
Edison34 case, the Supreme Court held that state approval of a private
utility's practices would not serve as a defense in the absence of proof
that the practices were crucial to achieving an important policy of the
state. In other words, the present analysis appears to be that if state
approval simply reflects indifference about a practice, no deference to
that approval is necessary. A comity approach to international jurisdic-
tion and to act of state defenses, therefore, might justify allowing immu-
nity based on foreign state approval only when important interests of the
foreign state are served by the practices, and that state's contacts with,
27 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
28 See United Mineworkers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
29 Compare Occidental Petroleum Co. v. Buttes Oil & Gas Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-08
(C.D. Cal. 1971), afdper curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972)
(refusing recognition of defense) with Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962) (suggesting that defense would be recognized in a proper case). Commen-
tators have generally favored allowing the defense. See, e.g., Graziano, Foreign Governmental Com-
pulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967) and P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST 'ANALYSIS, 192, at 130 (2d ed. 1974). But see W. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS, § 2.23, at 84-86 (2d ed. 1973).
30 ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 9, at 62-63.
31 See, e.g., 331 F. Supp. 92; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Co., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afd,
550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); General Aircraft Corp. v. Air
America, Inc., [1979-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 62,452 (D.D.C. 1979).
32 Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970). Other cases strongly suggest that foreign sovereign compulsion is not a complete defense.
Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 954 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 607 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1976).
33 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963] Trade
Cases (CCH) 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), decree modiftd, [1965] Trade Cases (CCH) 71,352
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
34 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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and interest in, the transaction clearly outweigh those of the United
States.
It is important to note that there are a great number of circum-
stances in which the defenses discussed above will not ensure that a
whole transaction is immune. The single most important caveat is that a
complex scheme with unprotected and illegal elements will not be saved
because joint approaches to foreign governments or foreign state action
were involved. 35 Second, injuring a competitor by applying false infor-
mation to a foreign administrative agency is probably not protected as
Noerr-Penninglon free speech.3 6 Third, if a foreign official involved in the
scheme is acting as a co-conspirator for private reasons, such as his re-
ceipt of a bribe, his participation will not immunize either him or the
scheme. 37 Fourth, foreign compulsion or state action may be treated as
ultra vires if the anti-competitive scheme is carried on outside that state's
territory, such as by acts in the United States. For instance, in its suit
against Bechtel for agreeing to boycott American firms on an Arab
League blacklist, the Antitrust Division contended that Arab states had
no right to compel boycotts of Americans by Americans in the United
States.
38
III. Recent Enforcement Developments
There have been two types of significant enforcement developments
in international antitrust in the last few years. One of these is the em-
phasis on advance guidance for Americans doing business abroad. The
second is an increasingly vigilant investigation and prosecution of signifi-
cant restraints on international competition.
A. Advance Guidance
As noted above, the Department of Justice, after extensive consulta-
tions with the President's Export Council, issued an Antitrust Guide for
International Operations in early 1977. 39 The Guide is organized into
an introduction setting out the Antitrust Division's general approach to
international cases followed by detailed discussions of fourteen hypothet-
ical cases, most of which were suggested by American companies en-
gaged in foreign trade and investment. The introduction states that the
Guide is intended to be a "working statement of government enforce-
ment policy. . . intended to help businesses plan transactions which the
Department of Justice is not likely to challenge, and to see which transac-
35 See, e.g., Dominicus Americanus v. Gulf & Western, 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
United States v. Sisal Sales Co., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
36 See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
37 See 370 U.S. 690; 274 U.S. 268.
38 United States v. Bechtel Corp., [1979-I] Trade Cases (CCH) 62,430 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
See also Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
39 See ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 9.
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tions are likely to require detailed factual inquiry by the enforcement
agencies."''4 It is emphasized that the Guide is not a substitute for the
Antitrust Division's Business Review Clearance Procedure or for the ad-
vice of private counsel.
It is not possible to summarize all of the points made or suggested in
the fourteen case discussions. A few highlights may be instructive. The
Guide indicated, contrary to business concerns based on a few old cases,
that the Antitrust Division usually would not challenge division of mar-
kets between a parent and subsidiary,4 1 joint ventures abroad to sell to
foreigners, 42 joint bidding on foreign projects, joint research ventures,43
or the appointment of an exclusive distributor abroad. 4 On the other
hand, the Division emphasized that it was likely to challenge restrictions
on export to the United States by a foreign joint venture or licensee
which exceeded the predictable life of the patents or know-how being
transferred or extended to products not covered by the technology
rights. 4 5 Exclusive grant-back requirements were also disfavored, as was
cooperation with a foreign cartel seeking to raise prices to the United
States--even a cartel supported by a foreign government. 46
Through the good offices of the Commerce Department, 35,000 cop-
ies of the Guide have been sent to U.S. firms and associations interested
in foreign commerce. At least one study, done for the Bureau of Mines,
has reported that publication of the Guide has been effective in allaying
fears of American firms engaged in business ventures abroad. 47
The Antitrust Division's Business Review Clearance Procedure re-
mains somewhat lightly used, probably because obtaining advice from
private lawyers is so frequent. In the last ten years, about twenty-two
business reviews were sought concerning proposed international activity.
Eighteen, or about eighty-five percent, were answered in the affirmative,
two were negative, and two were refused on grounds of mootness or
vagueness.
Following President Carter's export message of September 26, 1978,
the Division committed itself to accelerate the pace of clearances relating
to export trade. In December, a procedure went into effect for processing
such clearance requests within thirty working days.4 8
B Investigations and Prosecutions
During the last five years, the Antitrust Division has expanded its
40 Id at 1.
41 Id at 12-14.
42 Id at 28-32.
43 Id at 19-27.
44 Id. at 46-49.
45 Id. at 28-36.
46 Id at 42-45, 53-57.
47 BUREAU OF MINES, EVALUATION OF SELECTED FACTORS IMPACTING ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. MINERALS INDUSTRY 169 (1979).
48 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1978).
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Foreign Commerce section from seven lawyers to twenty-two, with a
more than corresponding increase in active investigation. Moreover, sec-
tions dealing with energy and transportation also investigate interna-
tional developments in those fields. In particular, the Energy Section is
conducting a major investigation of the role of the leading international
petroleum companies in the world oil market. The Division's investiga-
tions may seek documents or interviews in foreign countries when doing
so seems necessary and feasible and in accord with the law of the other
nations. In order to avoid diplomatic incidents in that regard, a regular
practice of informing affected governments of such investigations has
been instituted and is operating quite satisfactorily.
4 9
Prosecutions in the last five years have involved a great variety of
practices and defendants. Nevertheless, there are a number of common
threads running through the cases. In at least four of them, involving
lithium, 50 safes, 5 1 watches,5 2 and mink pelts, 53 an American firm or asso-
ciation pressured a foreign one to refrain from, or prevent, sales of com-
peting goods into the U.S. market. The mink case, United States V. National
Board of Fur Farms, 54 highlights two basic principles in this field. First,
the case involved U.S. firms who sought a private agreement with their
foreign rivals after failing to convince Congress to impose a quota on
mink imports. The imposition of criminal sanctions reflects the principle
that restraint of international trade is the prerogative of governments.
Vigilante trade restraints may be dealt with harshly. Second, the court
was unimpressed with the argument that agriculture is normally an in-
dustry where cooperative action is exempt from the antitrust laws. The
court accepted that a purpose of the exemption was to enable American
growers to compete more effectively with their foreign rivals, rather than
to facilitate collusion with them.55
A number of other recent cases also stress the principle that regula-
tory exemptions will be construed narrowly, with antitrust being em-
ployed as a sanction against unauthorized anticompetitive conduct. In
criminal prosecutions of U.S. and foreign airlines and shipping compa-
nies, the Justice Department attacked unfiled, unapproved agreements
restrictive of international competition. In both cases pleas were entered,
and substantial fines imposed. 56
49 See Address by Michael J. Egan, Address by Griffin B. Bell, supra note 4.
50 United States v. Foote Mineral Co., No. 74-1652 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
51 United States v. Diebold, Inc. and Chubb and Son, Ltd., Cr. No. 76-9A (N.D. Ohio
1976).
52 United States v. Norman Morris Corp., Civ. No. 76-495 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
53 United States v. Nat'l Bd. of Fur Farms Org., 395 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
54 Id.
5 Id
56 United States v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., [1977] 843 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) A-14; United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., [1979] 917 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-25; [1979] 918 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-29.
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The important Bechtel (Arab Boycott)57 and Gulf (Uranium Car-
tel)58 cases involve another principle of antitrust law. The existence of
foreign government support for a cartel will not excuse American compa-
nies whose cooperation with the cartel involves boycotting U.S. firms in
U.S. commerce beyond the point where any direct foreign compulsion is
present or valid.
Lastly, the Everest &Jenniqgs59 wheelchair monopolization case clari-
fies the directives of the Guide in regard to the operations of a multina-
tional. The defendant firm controlled roughly seventy percent of the
U.S. market and prevented its English affiliate from selling its lower-
priced chairs to American buyers. The complaint charged Everest &
Jennings not with a conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, but with monopolization and attempted monopolization in viola-
tion of section 2 of the Act. The case was settled on the basis of "affirma-
tive" relief. All restrictions on exporting foreign wheelchairs from E&J
affiliates to the United States were removed, and the parent company
was ordered to reward managers of its affiliates for so doing.6 0 This case
falls far short of rules suggested by the developing countries in interna-
tional code negotiations. The case involved a multinational with a domi-
nant market that was preventing export to the market in which it was
dominant. The rule in Everest &Jennings would certainly not apply to
every multinational preventing exports to any market. Also, the case in-
volved a refusal to sell for export to the United States a product that was
already for sale and for which the buyer was prepared to pay the custom-
ary price. The refusal to sell was solely for the purpose of protecting the
higher price structure of the parent in the United States.
United States v. Stud'engesellschafl Kohle, M.B.1. 6 1 is indicative of the
Division's continuing vigilance against unduly restrictive international
technology licensing. The court in Studiengesellschafi condemned an effort
to use the licensing of a patented process to restrict the resale of the re-
sulting product.
In its selection and disposal of cases, the Antitrust Division has been
careful to avoid letting elements of nationalism or mercantilism skew the
application of U.S. antitrust laws. This position has also been empha-
sized when the Division has become involved in cases of alleged dumping
or unfair foreign competition before the International Trade Commis-
sion. The Division has sought to ensure that exclusion of foreign goods is
not done unnecessarily, especially when this would leave U.S. consumers
57 [1979-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 1 62,430.
58 United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., [1978] 863 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-
13.
59 United States v. Everest & Jennings Int'l, [1979-1] Trade Cases (CCH) 62,508 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) (consent decree).
60 Id
61 [1978-2] Trade Cases (CCH) 9 62,291 (D.D.C. 1978).
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with a domestic monopoly or oligopoly as their only source of supply.62
Lastly, the Division has participated actively at the OECD and the
UN in the negotiation of international principles and guidelines concern-
ing the control of restrictive business practices. The Division's purpose in
these negotiations has been to engender harmonious, uniform conditions
under which U.S. and foreign firms compete in world markets, to draft
international norms calling for due process and non-discrimination in
antitrust laws and proceedings, to create procedures for airing and
resolving grievances about multinational corporations under agreed stan-
dards, and to work toward a climate favorable to free competition and
the preservation or expansion of free market sectors in national econo-
mies.63
Question and Answer Period
Mr. Davidow: In at least two recent monopoly cases-the Berkey
PhotoI case, and the SCM2 case-each holding largely for the defendant,
the court has emphasized that there really is no such thing in today's law
as no-fault monopolization. The courts are quite clearly not going to
find a company guilty of Sherman Act section 2 monopolization unless
they find conduct that is somewhere between exclusionary and abusive.
While its exact words are hard to formulate, the test requires some con-
duct by the monopolist that, rather than merely advancing his product
to the public, throws tacks under the tires of the competitor. In effect, it
must be some conduct whose primary purpose is not to advance any le-
gitimate interest of the monopolist, but to disadvantage the person who
has come in to compete with him. Therefore, under this hypothetical, no
possible case could be made because there is no suggestion of exclusion-
ary or abusive conduct.
Question: Why did the U.S. Department of Justice settle for only
misdemeanor action against Gulf and the Uranium cartel and why did it
not pursue charges against foreign uranium producers?
Mr. Davidow: Almost any audience will tell us that we are not tough
enough on some cases and far too tough on others. In fact, the Senate
has held hearings on exactly this question. Because antitrust violations
were a misdemeanor until December 1974 and became a felony thereaf-
ter, a whole series of cases has posed a difficult decision for us. For exam-
ple, suppose a cartel began in 1971, and the last overt act was in early
1974 but there was no specific withdrawal of the cartel until sometime in
1975. Since cartels often just fade away, there is no moment when every-
body rushes in and says "we disband" and announces the cartel is over.
62 Address by John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, before the ALI-ABA
Course of Study on International Antitrust Law, May 26, 1978.
63 See Davidow, Toward an International Antitrust Code, 65 A.B.A.J. 631 (1979).
1 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
2 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978).
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Consequently, for a cartel clearly within the misdemeanor period with
no absolutely certain withdrawal later than 1974, the courts have held
that if the prosecutor charges a felony and cannot convince the jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt that important aspects of the cartel existed dur-
ing the felony period, he loses the whole case. So the prosecutor must
decide whether to risk a perfectly good misdemeanor conviction to try to
push the cartel into ihe next year and get the felony. This issue will
largely disappear in a year or two because there will not be many pre-
1975 cartels to examine. A question regarding the selection of defend-
ants in a foreign case is the defendant's mens rea. For purposes of fairness
and equity, we have taken the view when indicting an individual for a
criminal offense, that there should be some reason to believe that he
knew he was violating the antitrust law. Conceivably, in cases with
Americans and foreigners involved, particularly if there were some af-
firmative action by the foreigners' government, the American might be
held to a higher standard of knowledge than the foreigner. One might
be a little more sympathetic to the argument that the foreigner could
have believed, on the basis of his government's attitude to the cartel, that
what he was doing was not illegal, but one would be less convinced about
the American who had in-house antitrust counsel on U.S. law.
Question: What about a U.S. firm exchanging detailed price product
and sales information with a foreign trade organization whose members
then exchange the data knowing which company submitted it?
Mr. Davidow: People sometimes forget that there is no rule in itself
in the antitrust law which says that exchanging any kind of information
is illegal. If two companies want to invite each other's president to the
research labs, that in itself is not illegal. The difficulty is that if prices
later behave uniformly, the exchange may be circumstantial evidence of
an intent to accomplish something. Therefore, we have given advice,
and private lawyers have given advice, that suggest a full series of pre-
cautions: that, in general, information should be on past transactions,
not current ones; that it should not break down transactions customer by
customer; and that there should be some neutral or objective group that
is screening the information and producing general data that is not iden-
tifiable by company. The thing that is illicit or illegal is agreeing to re-
strain prices or production; agreeing to exchange information may be
circumstantial evidence or may involve a tacit agreement to refrain from
price competition.
Question: Is there a formal procedure for obtaining a clearance or
opinion from the antitrust division?
Mr. Davidow: Yes. 28 CFR § 50.6 is the relevant passage, and is
mentioned in the Guide. However, any letter expressing such a desire
will cause a lawyer to call you up and read the right statute to you. But
the forms are not particularly complicated, and they basically deal with
getting the information in a way we can understand it.
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Questton: Doesn't the EEC exercise broader relief jurisdiction as in
the Commercial Solvents3 case than the United States?
Mr. Davidow: The answer is rarely, but occasionally. The Commercial
Solvents case involved a large American company that had been prepared
to supply products to one European licensee, but not to another. It was
held that this was a monopolistic refusal or abusive refusal to deal. The
American company was ordered to ship this chemical from St. Louis to
the Italian licensee, or ex-licensee, and this was obviously extraterritorial
relief. But it probably is an unusual case in that very few American cases
turn on refusals to deal; it is not as clearly an offense under possible
abuses of a dominant position, and the Common Market would allow a
dominant position to be found for a firm with twenty-five or forty per-
cent market share, whereas we probably would not. Therefore, since this
is one of the very rare cases where their relief has extended that far, on
balance we still are more aggressive.
3 Sharp v. Commercial Solvents Corp., 232 F. Supp. 323 (D. Tex. 1964).
